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Abstract
Ninety-eight Australian students participated in a functional replication of a study published by Dijksterhuis et al.
(2006). The results indicated that unconscious thought does not necessarily lead to better normative decision making
performance than conscious thought, which is contrary to the results found in Dijksterhuis et al. Since other studies
showed a positive, though statistically not signiﬁcant, effect for unconscious thought, a meta-analysis comprising a
total of 17 experiments was conducted. It suggests that there is little evidence for an advantage to normative decision
making using unconscious thought. However, a discussion of potential moderators shows that further study would help
to identify situations in which unconscious thought is truly helpful and those in which it is not.
Keywords: unconscious thought, meta-analysis, normative decision making.
1 Introduction
In a series of studies, Dijksterhuis and colleagues (e.g.,
Dijksterhuis, 2004b; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van
Baaren, 2006; Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006) established
the surprising and counterintuitive ﬁnding that uncon-
scious thought leads to better decision making perfor-
mance for complex problems than conscious thought.
Unconscious thought is deﬁned as “cognitive and/ or
affective task-relevant processes that take place outside
conscious awareness” (Dijksterhuis, 2004b, p. 586). A
second postulate is that the reverse is true for simple de-
cision: consciously thinking about them is better. This
paper is concerned only with the ﬁrst.
A common denominator of all experiments described
by Dijksterhuis and colleagues is the experimental tech-
nique. Participants are split in two or three groups and
provided with a number of pieces of information about a
numberofoptionstochoosefrom, forinstancefourapart-
ments or ﬂatmates. Each option is described by the same
number of attributes, and usually these are attributes of
the choice option. For example, an attribute of all choice
options for “apartments” might be the size. Typically
these attributes are conceptualized dichotomously — ei-
ther an apartment is spacious or it is not. All pieces of
information about all choice options are presented either
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as lists (e.g., Newell, Wong, Cheung, & Rakow, submit-
ted), individually and randomized (e.g., this study), or in-
dividually in a ﬁxed order (e.g., Phillips et al., 2007) for
a ﬁxed amount of time. Prior to the information presen-
tation, participants are informed that they will have to a)
choose one of the options (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004b, Ex-
periment 1) or b) rate each option (e.g., Lerouge, submit-
ted). Then, following the presentation of the information,
participants either immediately make a choice between
options or think about their choice for a ﬁxed amount of
time (except in Payne, Samper, Bettman, & Luce, 2007),
or are distracted for the same amount of time before mak-
ing their decision.
The principal claim is that, when the number of fac-
tors that ought to be considered is high (as indicated by
the number of attributes), and the decision is therefore
complex, unconscious thought will lead to better deci-
sion performance than conscious deliberation. Better de-
cision making (which I call “normative” here) is deﬁned
as choosing, or ranking higher, options with more pos-
itive features. However, although most of Dijksterhuis
and colleagues’ experiments found an effect in the hy-
pothesized direction, such effects often failed to reach
statistical signiﬁcance when comparing the unconscious
and conscious group directly. For example, in the ﬁrst
reported experiment in Dijksterhuis’ 2004 study the crit-
ical comparison did not reach statistical signiﬁcance (p <
.08).
In this context it is important to point out that in the se-
quence of experiments carried out by Dijksterhuis, only
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the ﬁrst two to be published (Dijksterhuis, 2004, Experi-
ments 1 and 2) were exclusively directed at establishing
differences between decision success under unconscious
versus conscious thought. The other experiments primar-
ily investigated further aspects of what was to become
the theory of unconscious thought (Dijksterhuis & Nord-
gren, 2006). For example, Experiments 1 and 2 of Di-
jksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, and van Baaren’s 2006 study
dealt with the deliberation without attention effect, which
required two conditions: a complex and a simple one,
which were differentiated by the number of information
bits participants received. However, even though these
studies did not primarily contrast conscious with uncon-
scious thought, they frequently provided data supporting
the notion that unconscious thought is a superior form of
integrating a large amount of information.
Conscious thought, according to Dijksterhuis, is very
usefulformonitoringinformationwithrespecttoapartic-
ular criterion, for example the minimal amount of space
that must be available in an apartment. It can engage in
logical operations and work with quantities in a precise
fashion, as is the case in mathematical operations. On the
other hand, it has limited capacity and is thus unsuitable
to integrate large amounts of information. Unconscious
thought, on the other hand, is claimed to possess virtually
inﬁnite processing capacity, to process information diver-
gently and to employ a natural weighing mechanism for
acquired information. The alleged differences between
the two forms of thought have been described by six prin-
ciples and some additional characteristics in Dijksterhuis
and Nordgren (2006), who re-stated the basic tenet that
unconscious thought works well for complex decision
situations with multiple sources of relevant information.
Despite its empirical successes and its advanced concep-
tual development, the theory of unconscious thought has
not been without criticism.
Shanks (2006), for example claimed that the uncon-
sciousthoughteffectswereanartefactofdifferentialrates
of forgetting rather than the product of different forms
of processing. The theory was also criticised for lim-
ited sample size in supporting studies, and concern was
voiced about the applicability of the theory to the clini-
cal context (Bekker, 2006) for which, as Dijksterhuis and
colleagues pointed out, the theory was not intended. In
addition to these criticisms, the currently published data
are fairly limited in that they almost exclusively include
studies from one laboratory.
The purpose of the present article is two-fold. The
ﬁrst aim is to provide replication data for the unconscious
decision making effect with an English-speaking sample
and English stimulus material. The study was also de-
signed to gather additional information to rule out poten-
tial alternative explanations for the unconscious thought
effect. Secondly, this article aims to provide a statisti-
cally more robust estimate of the population effect size
for the unconscious thought effect by meta-analytically
synthesizing data from a subset of studies on unconscious
thought.
2 Empirical Study
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants
All participants were third year psychology students that
took part in this experiment in the context of a tutorial se-
ries on decision making. Participation in the experiment
wasvoluntaryandanonymous. Theparticipationratewas
90%, resulting in a total N = 98. There was a notable gen-
der imbalance with females outnumbering males by 4:1.
All students were naïve to the experimental hypothesis
and unfamiliar with the theory of unconscious thought.
2.1.2 Materials and procedure
The participants were tested in three groups of about 32
individuals. They were seated about 1.5 metres apart
and were not permitted to talk during the experiment. In
line with the procedure described in Dijksterhuis, Bos,
Nordgren, and van Baaren (2006) participants were pre-
sented with 48 sentences describing four ﬁctitious cars
(the Hatsdun, Kaiwa, Dasuka and Nabusi) on 12 at-
tributes (e.g., milage, handling, service) in either negative
or positive terms. The sentences were randomized and
each sentence was presented for ﬁve seconds using Mi-
crosoft Powerpoint. The sentences were taken from the
supplementary material published in the Dijkersterhuis et
al. (2006) study. All sentences were examined by two
individuals to ensure that each sentence was intelligible
to Australian subjects, and all were. Before the presen-
tation, students were introduced to the names of the four
cars and were told that they would have to pay attention
to the material as they would later have to pass judgment
on each of the cars. Response sheets were handed face-
down to all participants which sequentially assigned par-
ticipants to groups c, u or i. After the presentation, each
individual ﬁlled in the response form, following the di-
rections printed on the form.
In the conscious thought group c participants were in-
structed to think for four minutes about the different cars
and their attributes before rating them. Participants in
group u (unconscious thought) had to work on a word
search task for four minutes after which they ﬁlled in
their response sheet. Participants in group i (immediate)
rated the cars right after the presentation ﬁnished. The
ratings of the cars for all three groups had to be made onJudgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 4, April 2008 Conscious versus unconscious thought 294
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Figure 1: Mean ratings of the four cars by group
a 10-point rating scale, where 10 indicated the best possi-
ble rating. The sequence within which the cars appeared
on the response sheet was also randomized separately for
each subject. Thus only a few individuals within each
group received the same rating sequence. Following their
rating of the cars, participants were asked to indicate
which two of the 12 presented attributes they considered
to be the most important to themselves. The entire ex-
periment, from giving instructions to the collection of the
response sheets, took about 25 minutes per group.
2.2 Results
Out of the 96 participants, 32 were assigned to group
c, 34 to group u and 30 to group i. The results clearly
demonstrated the main effect for cars. In all three groups,
the Hatsdun (best car based on number of positive fea-
tures) was rated higher (mc = 6.93, sdc = 1.71; mu = 5.88,
sdc = 2.66; mi = 6.16, sdi = 1.73) than the Nabusi (mc
= 4.35, sdc = 1.85; mu = 4.64, sdc = 2.08; mi = 4.19,
sdi = 1.95), which was the worst car based on number of
positive features. Figure 1 illustrates this point. This dif-
ference was very pronounced for group c, somewhat less
clear for group i and least evident for group u (see Figure
2).
The biggest surprise in these results was that the differ-
ences among the cars was smaller and the within group
variance was larger for the unconscious decision makers
than for the conscious ones.1 This was exactly opposite
1The within-group variance is of interest because, according to the
theory, we would expect a homogeneous improvement for all par-
ticipants following unconscious thought, and, especially, participants
should be better equipped to differentiate clearly between different
choice levels (distinguish best from second best, from third best, etc.).
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Figure 2: 95% conﬁdence intervals for the difference
scores between Hatsdun and Nabusi for groups Con-
scious, Unconscious, and Immediate, with proportions
overlapping or showing a difference. Proportion overlap
or gap is expressed in terms of the average of the half-
widths of the two conﬁdence intervals.
to the predictions of the unconscious thought theory and
the ﬁndings in the original experiment by Dijksterhuis et
al. (2006). In fact, for group u the car with the second
most positive attributes, the Kaiwa, was rated higher than
the supposedly better car, the Hatsdun. Looking at the
group differences for the Hatsdun only, it becomes clear
that conscious thought was set apart from the other two
groups. However, the overlap between c and u was still
substantial, mostly due to the conﬁdence interval width
for u (see Figure 3a). A similar result ensued when com-
paring the mean difference scores between the Hatsdun
and the Nabusi for each group. Again, the degree of vari-
ation was smallest for group c and largest for group u,
but the overlap was still fairly substantial. Figure 3b il-
lustrates this point.
One potential explanation for the surprising effect
could be that the values for the Hatsdun were more ex-
treme for group c, whereas participants in group u gen-
erally were more careful in their ratings. For example,
participants in group c may have been more inclined to
give a rating of 10 to their favourite car than participants
in group u, who might have avoided the scale ends alto-
gether. This hypothetical difference in scale usage would
have resulted in a clear distinction of the normatively
best car for group c and a very marginal distinction for
That was precisely not the case as the scores for this group were highly
variable. Some rated the Hatsdun very low and the Nabusi very high
and vice versa. It is this variability in the ratings for the different cars
within each group that determines the width of the conﬁdence interval
in Figure 3.Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 4, April 2008 Conscious versus unconscious thought 295
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Figure 3: (A) 95% conﬁdence interval showing the mean comparison for Hatsdun ratings between groups; (B) 95%
conﬁdence intervals showing the comparison of mean differences between H and N by group. Proportion overlap or
gap is expressed in terms of the average of the half-widths of the two conﬁdence intervals.
group u. If this explanation were valid, then a conver-
sion of scores into ranks should offset the effect, and the
Hatsdun should have been rated as the best car most fre-
quently in all three groups. Table 2 shows that this was
not the case. Even after the conversion into ranks, group c
showed much clearer results than group u. This suggests
that individuals in the unconscious decision group were
less sure about which car is best and, accordingly, score
preferences ﬂuctuated.
A second explanation for the results is that the impor-
tance individuals placed on particular features of cars dif-
fered across groups and therefore the Kaiwa was rated
higher than the Hatsdun in group u. Since the feature
valence for the Kaiwa and the Hatsdun were not identi-
cal — the Kaiwa, for example, was described as having
more leg space than the Hatsdun — this may have inﬂu-
enced the results if leg space was an important feature
to many participants. Note that this explanation is some-
what at odds with the unconscious thought theory, which
posits that not so much individual features as the overall
attractiveness of a choice option would be considered by
unconscious thought in the decision making process.
The data that were collected on the two most important
features for each participant allowed an educated guess
about the validity of this explanation. As Table 3 illus-
trates, participants in groups u, c, and i had fairly similar
feature preferences. Differences ensued only for those
features that were only seldom selected as one of the two
most important. Linking the results of Table 3 to Table
1, which shows the positive and negative attributes for
each car, it is clear that differences in attribute valence be-
tween the Kaiwa and the Hatsdun, with the exception of
handling, were restricted to the less important categories.
The important ones had the same valence for either car,
and, in the case of handling, it was the Hatsdun that had
a positive valence for this feature, not the Kaiwa. This
result implies that, regardless of whether a decision about
the better car was made on the basis of counting the num-
ber of positive attributes (Hatsdun = 9, Kaiwa = 7) or also
by the value that a person assigns to the attribute into con-
sideration, there should have been no difference between
the two cars or, if anything, a preference for the Hatsdun.
Another transformation illustrates the discrepancy
evenfurther. Foreachoftheattributes, aproportionbased
on the within group count was calculated that showed its
importance relative to the other eleven. These propor-
tions were then multiplied by the valence score for each
attribute for each car (1 if the attribute was positive for
the car and 0 if it was negative). These scores were then
summed and averaged, using the number of positive at-
tributes for the car, which yielded the mean importance
score for each positive attribute for each car. Comparing
these scores for each of the cars and groups (Table 4), it is
clear that the differences across groups were minute and
that, in fact, the cars with more positive attributes also
were described in positive terms for those categories that
were regarded as important by the participants. Again,
thedatadonotprovideanyhintsfortheunexpectedgroup
differences between c and u.
A third potential explanation is that the sequence of
statements during the presentation may have had a vari-
able effect on the groups. This is unlikely since all groups
saw the same sequence. With the data collected, however,
it is also not possible to disprove this hypothesis. An in-Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 4, April 2008 Conscious versus unconscious thought 296
Table 1: Valence for the 12 attributes for each choice op-
tion. A valueof “1” implies positive, “0” implies negative
valence.
Attributes Hatsdun Kawai Dasuka Nabusi
Environment 1 1 0 0
Cupholders 1 0 1 1
Many colours 1 1 0 1
Sound system 0 0 1 0
Service 1 1 0 0
Handling 1 0 1 0
Milage 1 1 0 0
Leg Space 0 1 0 1
Trunk size 1 1 0 0
Sunroof 1 0 1 1
Gear shifting 0 1 1 0
Age 1 0 1 0
Sum 9 7 6 4
spection of the items showed only one permutation that
could have lead to a primacy or recency effect. Out of the
last eight items, four were negative statements about the
Nabusi, yet only one of these four related to an important
attribute.
In summary, the experimental manipulation for the
cars was successful, in that the cars with more features
were rated as the better ones, and some of these cars’
features were also considered the most important, such
as their environmental performance. The two cars with
less positive features overall additionally had less desir-
able features, such as cupholders or trunk space. The
clearest difference between the cars was obtained for the
conscious thinkers, the least distinction was achieved by
the unconscious thinkers. This result was not statisti-
cally conclusive due to the high variability within group
u. Artefactual explanations such as primacy and recency
effectsordifferentpreferencesforfeaturesandhencecars
by the various groups were rejected on the basis of the
data.
3 Meta analysis
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Study selection
The purpose of the meta-analysis was to compile all
relevant study data that bear on the beneﬁt of uncon-
scious thought for normative decision making. The
studies carried out by Dijksterhuis and colleagues show
Table 2: Rank averages for the four cars by group.
Hatsdun Kaiwa Dasuka Nabusi
Conscious 1.68 1.97 2.71 3.29
Unconscious 2.31 1.97 2.54 2.86
Immediate 2.00 1.93 2.60 3.10
high methodological homogeneity and largely reﬂect the
method used in the empirical study described here. The
focus of the meta-analysis was restricted to those stud-
ies that directly compared unconscious and conscious
thought with respect to a decision making task after the
presentation of a large amount of stimulus material for
different choice alternatives.
Studies on incubation, which arguably also deal with
unconscious thought, were not included. Incubation stud-
ies usually present the participant with a problem solv-
ing task (e.g., Vul & Pashler, 2007) or judge the creative
output after a period of incubation (e.g., Dijksterhuis &
Meurs, 2006). Both of these approaches are clearly dif-
ferent from the methodological selection criterion out-
lined and thus do not qualify for the meta-analysis.
Other studies that deal more directly with unconscious
thought but also were not included are those that oper-
ationalise good decision making as post-choice satisfac-
tion (e.g., Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006). Judging the
degree of content with an item after a period of time does
not appear to be functionally equivalent to making a rela-
tively instantaneous decision based on comparative judg-
ment. Thus, including studies which use post-choice sat-
isfactionasthedependentvariablewouldhaveintroduced
further error variance into the analysis beyond the normal
sampling variability and ultimately biased the overall ef-
fect size estimate.
In order to be included a study had to focus on nor-
mative decision making, compared unconscious and con-
scious thought conditions, operationalise unconscious
thought as a distraction period following a standardized
encoding period, present each piece of information for
the same amount of time or at least make provisions for
the participants to do so, make participants choose from
or evaluate multiple, speciﬁed choice options, and ﬁnally
operationalise choice options in terms of degree of good
decision making rather than choosing the correct out of a
number of incorrect options.
Studies were sourced using the psychinfo database
(1806-present) and Google Scholar with the keywords
“unconscious thought”, “decision making”, and “incu-
bation” and results were narrowed down with combina-
tions of these. Additionally, references cited in Dijkster-
huis (2004b), Dijksterhuis et al. (2006), and Dijksterhuis
et al. (in press) were checked for compliance with theJudgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 4, April 2008 Conscious versus unconscious thought 297
Table 3: Distribution of feature importance rating across groups. Distributions are fairly similar for all three groups
and clearly distinguishes between important and unimportant features.
Group EN CU CO SOU SE HA MI LS TR SF GE A
C 12 1 4 3 9 11 12 2 0 3 3 3
U 10 0 4 2 12 11 9 6 1 3 1 7
I 15 2 3 1 8 11 8 2 0 1 5 3
Note. EN=Environment, CU = Cupholders, CO = Colours, SOU = Sound system,
SE = Service, HA = Handling, MI = Milage, LS = Leg space, TR = Trunk space,
SF = Sunroof, GE = Gears, A = Age. The numbers show how often each feature
was named as one of the two most important ones.
Table 4: Mean feature importance for each car by groups
and overall.
Overall C U I
Hatsdun 0.096 0.097 0.096 0.096
Kaiwa 0.096 0.095 0.093 0.099
Dasuka 0.063 0.063 0.061 0.065
Nabusi 0.041 0.040 0.049 0.034
selection criterion. Finally, studies citing either Dijkster-
huis (2004b) or Dijksterhuis et al. (2006) were checked.
Two sets of data were identiﬁed to be of potential use-
fulness to this analysis but could not be obtained. These
were one data set pertaining to decision quality after
varying intervals of unconscious thought (Dijksterhuis,
2004a, as cited in Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006) and a
study that used the same stimulus material as the present
study (Dijksterhuis, Bos, van Baaren, & van der Leij, in
prep., as cited in Dijksterhuis et al., in press). However,
instead of a contrast between unconscious thought and
conscious thought, it focuses on the comparison between
immediate decision making and unconscious thought.
Overall, only two published studies comprising six ex-
periments were deemed to sufﬁciently fulﬁll the original
selection criteria. These experiments were number 1 to
4 in Dijksterhuis (2004b), Experiments 1 and 2 in Di-
jksterhuis et al. (2006). All other studies cited in this
meta-analysis have not yet been published and had ei-
ther been cited in work by Dijksterhuis or came to my
attention through word of mouth. This class of unpub-
lished works included ﬁve additional studies incorporat-
ing 10 sets of relevant data. These data were extracted
from Experiments 1 and 2 of the Ham, Bos and Doorn
study (Ham, Bos, & Doorn, submitted), Experiments 1, 2
and 3 of Newell et al.’s (submitted) study, Experiments 1
and 2 reported by Payne et al. (2007), aggregate ﬁndings
reported by Phillips et al. (2007), as well as from a study
by Lerouge (submitted).
Experiment 2 of the Dijksterhuis et al. (2006) was the
most comparable to the present empirical study. The
main points of distinction were the difference in depen-
dent variable scaling (50 point visual analogue versus 10
point rating) and the presentation time per item (8 versus
5 seconds). Experiment 1 (Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren,
& van Baaren, 2006) looked at proportional differences
between participants in the unconscious and conscious
thinking groups with respect to selecting the best choice
alternative. In Dijsterhuis’ 2004 study, Experiments 1
and 2 were fairly similar to the present experiment, albeit
the stimulus material was different. Experiment 3 (Dijk-
sterhuis, 2004b) was functionally similar to Experiment 2
but with yet again other stimulus materials. It also looked
at the importance an individual places on the different in-
formation attributes that are presented and correlated this
with the decision score. The present experiment had a
similar index, however, in a more rudimentary form.
Experiment 4 (Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van
Baaren, 2006) was not directly concerned with alternative
selection but rather with the re-attribution of item content
to its source. In comparison to the other experiments, the
encoded items did not have to be integrated into global
judgments but rather had to be remembered individually.
The experiment also fostered response speed as a second
dependent variable, but these results were not included
here. The decision to include this experiment is debat-
able, but it seemed sufﬁciently suitable as the attribution
stillinvolvedsomedecisionmaking, althoughonanitem-
by-item level, after the same encoding procedure as in the
other experiments.
Ham et al.’s experiments (Ham, Bos, & Doorn, submit-
ted) were again functionally quite similar to the present
experiment but focused on justice judgments rather than
consumer choice. Newell et al. (submitted) presented
four experiments. The ﬁrst three experiments were in-
cluded in the meta-analysis, the fourth one was not. In
all experiments Newell et al. collected data on a varietyJudgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 4, April 2008 Conscious versus unconscious thought 298
of dependent measures, such as a recall test for attributes,
but only the data on choice preferences were used for the
meta-analysis. Experiment 3 is virtually identical with
the empirical study presented here in that it is also a di-
rect replication of Dijksterhuis et al. (2006) using the
same materials. In contrast, Experiments 1 and 2 also
used the same normative choice methodology but with
original stimulus material. In Experiment 2 an additional
experimental group is included: conscious thinkers that
have access to the relevant information during the deci-
sion making period. Data from this group were not in-
cluded in the meta-analysis but based on the results re-
ported by Newell et al., their inclusion would not have
much difference. Experiment 4 investigated the impact
of primacy and recency effect on conscious and uncon-
scious choices. It was unsuitable for inclusion to the
meta-analysis as it only contained two choice alternatives
but mainly because the two cars were both described by
10positiveattributessothattherewasnonormatively‘ra-
tional’ choice.
Payne et al. (2007) carried out two experiments that
explored the boundary conditions of the unconscious
thought effect. In addition to the contrast between usual
conscious thought and unconscious thought, they in-
cluded a further condition where the decision interval for
conscious thought was self-paced. Only the conscious
thought condition with a ﬁxed time interval between pre-
sentation and decision was included in the meta-analysis.
Both of Payne et al.’s experiments used a design whereby
different numerical values were assigned to each piece of
information and which resulted in different expected util-
ities for each choice option. Contrary to other studies,
this method required successful and precise analytic inte-
gration of the values for each option, instead of choices
based on the gist of all items.
The data set obtained from Phillips et al.’s study is part
of a larger online study. Phillips et al. looked at, among
other things, the effect of item presentation order, but the
data presented here has been collapsed across all presen-
tation order positions.
Finally Lerouge’s study (submitted) dealt explicitly
with consumer choice but primarily investigated the im-
pact of conﬁgural versus featural processing as a mod-
erator of unconscious thought. Only Experiment 2 was
included, since Experiment 1 generated data only for im-
mediate and unconscious thought, but not for conscious
thought. All experiments listed here aside from Dijk-
sterhuis et al. (2006) also included the immediate choice
condition, which is of subordinate interest in the present
study.
The selection of studies was homogeneous in terms of
generalmethodologicalapproach, albeitwithmuchvaria-
tion in the exact procedure. Table 5 provides an overview
of some key aspects that lend themselves to meta-analytic
investigation. A variety of decision processes and infor-
mation conditions is represented. Decision making suc-
cess is identiﬁed as choosing the best option and compar-
ing the proportions across groups or by rating each choice
option and then deriving some form of mean difference
between groups. Ham et al.’s study presents an exception
to these two patterns. Regarding the information presen-
tation, most experiments presented the items one by one,
but few presented multiple pieces of information simulta-
neously. Most studies included three conditions: imme-
diate, conscious and unconscious decision making, but
some (Newell et al., submitted; Payne et al., 2007) had
an additional condition to test speciﬁc predictions. The
gender ratio also varied, although females predominated
in most studies. There were minor variations with respect
to the number of attributes for each choice option or the
interval length after the presentation of the stimulus ma-
terial (with the exception of Newell et al., Experiment 2).
3.1.2 Meta analytic procedure
For each of the selected experiments, standardized ef-
fect sizes (g) were calculated following the guidelines
presented in Grissom and Kim (2005) for mean differ-
ences and DeCoster (2004) for proportion differences. In
line with recommendations of Schmidt, Oh and Hayes (in
press) a random effects model was chosen for the analy-
sis. Weights and the mean effect size were calculated us-
ing the procedure described in Borenstein, Hedges, Hig-
gins, & Rothstein (2008). Gender ratio, presentation time
per item, and decision (or better distraction) interval span
were deﬁned as moderators. Since the moderator vari-
able investigated in Lerouge (submitted) had an appre-
ciable effect on the results, the experiment was treated as
two separate data sets for the meta-analysis in order to
preserve this noteworthy contrast. This decision did not
affect the ﬁnal estimates of the population effect size and
margin of error. The data as presented below overesti-
mate the parameters by about 0.006, in contrast to esti-
mates that treat Lerouge’s study as a single data set.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Unconscious versus conscious thought
Altogether 17 experiments were included in the analysis
with a combined participant number of 888. The mean
effect size was g = .251, and the range from g = (-.483)
in Payne et al.’s study (Experiment 2) to 1.25 (Dijkster-
huis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006, Experiment 2).
Figure 4 shows a forest plot of effect sizes with respec-
tive conﬁdence intervals by study and Table 6 provides
the numerical effect size values, the standard error and
the relative weights.Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 4, April 2008 Conscious versus unconscious thought 299
Table 5: Overview of key features of the experiments included in the meta-analysis.
Expt.1 Groups2 Material
type
Gender
ratio
(M/F)
n Judg-
ment
type3
ES4 Number
of at-
tributes
Presenta-
tion
Filler task Presen-
tation
time
(sec)5
Inter-
val
(min)
1 c,u,i Cars 0.250 32 1 1 12 Random word search 5 4
2 c,u Cars ? 20 2 2 12 Random anagrams 8 4
3 c,u Cars ? 13 1 1 12 Random anagrams 8 4
4 c,u,i Apartments 0.312 21 1 1 12 Random n-back task 4 3
5 c,u,i Apartments 0.175 31 2 2 15 Fixed n-back task 12 3
6 c,u,i Person 0.355 48 1 1 12 Random anagrams 2 4
7 c,u,i Person 0.295 38 3 3 N/A Random anagrams 2 4
8 c,u,i Person 0.250 18 3 3 14 Fixed n-back task 26 3
9 c,u,i Person 0.500 17 3 3 14 Fixed n-back task 26 3
10 c,u,i Notebooks ? 21 1 1 12 Fixed anagrams 20 4
11 c,u,i Notebooks ? 21 1 1 12 Fixed anagrams 20 4
12 c,u,i Apartments 0.610 23 2 2 10 Random anagrams 4 4
13 c,u,i,(c+) Apartments 0.415 23 2 2 10 Fixed anagrams 180 8
14 c,u,i Cars 0.607 30 2 2 12 Random anagrams 4 4
15 c,u,(c+) Lottery 1.158 20 2 2 12 Random anagrams 6 4
16 c,u,i,(c+) Lottery 1.947 28 2 2 12 Random anagrams 6 4
17 c,u Cars 0.428 40 1 1 12 Collapsed anagrams 8 4
1 The sequence for this table is the same as in Figure 4 and Table 6.
2 The combination (c+) indicates that there was a special condition involving conscious thought. Data from
these conditions were not used here.
3 Value “1” indicates use of rating scales for all options, value “2” stands for selection of a particular (usually
best) alternative, value “3” are other, generic measures.
4 ES stands for effect size estimator. Value “1” indicates difference between highest and lowest rated option, “2”
indicates difference between percentages of correct choice in groups, and “3” indicates other, generic indices.
5 Values >10 indicate that all information for a given option was presented simultaneously, the value >100
indicates that all information for all options were presented simultaneously.
The amount of variability between the effect sizes was
substantial (Q[df=16] = 54.994, p ≤ .000; I2= 70.906).
Only ﬁve out of the included 17 experiments returned re-
sults that can be described as “statistically signiﬁcant” in
classical terms. Each of these ﬁve provided evidence for
the superiority of unconscious thought. They also had
the largest effect sizes but at the same time the smallest
sample sizes. Newer data that still await publication pro-
vided evidence conﬂicting with the unconscious thought
theory. The aggregate estimate shows a modest beneﬁt
for unconscious thought, although, from a signiﬁcance-
testing perspective, the conﬁdence interval includes “0”
and can thus be interpreted as non-signiﬁcant support.
3.2.2 Moderator variables
Given the high level of study heterogeneity, several meta-
regressions were carried out to investigate the effect of
potential moderator variables. The statistical package
Comprehensive Meta AnalysisTM (Borenstein, Hedges,
Higgins, & Rothstein, 2008) was used for this purpose.
Gender ratio: Dijksterhuis (2004), in his discussion of
Experiment 1, found an interaction between gender and
thought condition. Males were choosing particularly well
following unconscious thought. Other studies have not
speciﬁcally investigated this point, but it was worthwhile
to follow up with a large set of data here. The vast ma-Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 4, April 2008 Conscious versus unconscious thought 300
This study
Dijksterhuis (2004), Exp 1
Dijksterhuis (2004), Exp 2
Dijksterhuis (2004), Exp 3
Dijksterhuis (2004), Exp 4
Dijksterhuis et al. (2006), Exp 1
Dijksterhuis et al. (2006), Exp 2
Ham et al. (sfp), Exp 2
Ham et al. (sfp), Exp1
Lerouge (sfp), Exp 2 configural
Lerouge (sfp), Exp 2, featural
Newell et al. (sfp), Exp 1
Newell et al. (sfp), Exp 2
Newell et al. (sfp), Exp 3
Payne et al. (2007), Exp 1
Payne et al. (2007), Exp 2
Phillips et al. (2007)
Overall
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Figure 4: Forest plot of studies displaying effect sizes and
95% conﬁdence intervals.
jority of experiments exhibited a surplus of females, with
the exception of Payne et al. (2007). The experiments by
Lerouge (submitted) and Dijksterhuis et al. (2006) were
not included as no data on gender were available. The
regression analysis suggested that the gender ratio of a
study is a poor predictor of effect size ( β = −0.214, CI95
[−0.786, 0.357], SE = 0.291).
Item presentation duration: The analysis of item pre-
sentation duration focused only on those studies that
showed each piece of information individually. Stud-
ies (Dijksterhuis, 2004, Experiment 4; Ham et al., sub-
mitted, Experiments 1 and 2, Lerouge, submitted, both
conditions; Newell et al., submitted, Experiment 2) that
showed items list-wise or all simultaneously were ex-
cluded. The analysis showed a trend that longer pre-
sentation times per item led to less advantage for uncon-
sciousthought, butthisrelationshipwasslightanddidnot
reach statistical signiﬁcance (β = −0.095, CI95 [−0.232,
0.042], SE = 0.07).
Thought interval: All studies were included in this
meta-regression. Similar to the item presentation vari-
able, the results suggested that a longer interval between
information presentation and decision is favourable for
conscious thought rather than unconscious thought.
Again, though, the result did not reach statistical signif-
icance (β = −0.199, CI95 [−0.445, 0.048], SE = 0.126)
and was strongly inﬂuence by Newell et al.’s (submitted)
second experiment, which had a substantially longer in-
terval than all other studies.
Table 6: Effect sizes (g), standard errors (SE) and rela-
tive weights (w) for the experiments included in the meta-
analysis. The abbreviation sfp means “submitted for pub-
lication.”
Study name g SE w
This study 0.471 0.243 6.743
Dijksterhuis (2004), Exp 1 0.434 0.306 5.998
Dijksterhuis (2004), Exp 2 0.242 0.277 6.340
Dijksterhuis (2004), Exp 3 0.241 0.203 7.205
Dijksterhuis (2004), Exp 4 0.065 0.267 6.459
Dijksterhuis et al. (2006), Exp 1 0.968 0.390 5.054
Dijksterhuis et al. (2006), Exp 2 1.247 0.417 4.774
Ham et al. (sfp), Exp 2 0.883 0.352 5.469
Ham et al. (sfp), Exp 1 1.055 0.349 5.503
Lerouge (sfp), Exp 2 conﬁgural 1.116 0.326 5.765
Lerouge (sfp), Exp 2, featural −0.064 0.303 6.033
Newell et al. (sfp), Exp 1 0.171 0.336 5.650
Newell et al. (sfp), Exp 2 −0.504 0.381 5.150
Newell et al. (sfp), Exp 3 −0.367 0.285 6.245
Payne et al. (2007), Exp 1 0.722 0.393 5.025
Payne et al. (2007), Exp 2 −0.483 0.340 5.604
Phillips et al. (2007) −0.251 0.222 6.984
Overall 0.251 0.137
Presentation format: A last moderator variable was
the effect of presenting all pieces of information either in-
dividually or in clusters (as lists for each choice option or
all simultaneously). This information was not available
for Phillips et al.’s data, which was therefore excluded
from the analysis. The results showed that the aggregate
effect size was lower (g = 0.147, CI95 [−0.037, 0.331],
SE = 0.094) for experiments that presented the items in-
dividually (n = 9) than for the overall estimate. On the
other hand, the results for studies that presented multiple
pieces of information at the same time (n = 6) suggested
a higher and most likely positive effect (g = 0.369, CI95
[0.110, 0.627], SE = 0.132). This means that unconscious
thought may actually be helpful when much information
is presented simultaneously, but not when bits of infor-
mation are presented individually.
3.2.3 Unconscious thought versus immediate deci-
sion making
Altogether 13 out of the 17 data sets were included in
a meta-analysis comparing decision making after uncon-
scious thought with immediate decision making. The ﬁve
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conditions. These were Dijksterhuis et al. (2006, Exper-
iments 1 and 2), Payne et al. (2007, Experiment 1) and
Phillips et al. (2007). The results were similar to the
comparison of unconscious and conscious thought. There
was a modest trend in favour of unconscious thought (g
= 0.189, CI95 [−0.05, 0.428]) but a signiﬁcant amount
of heterogeneity across studies (Q[df=12] = 26.691, p =
.009; I2= 55.041). Further analyses to identify true mod-
erator variables were not carried out.
3.2.4 Conscious thought versus immediate decision
making
The same 13 data sets were used for the con-
scious thought versus immediate decision making meta-
analysis. The results showed only a very slight advantage
for conscious thought over immediate decision making
(g = 0.084, CI95 [−0.72, 0.24]) with substantially more
agreement among experiments than for the other compar-
isons (Q[df=12] = 9.77, p = .636; I2= 0).
4 Discussion
4.1 Empirical study
The results of the present experiment are noticeably at
odds with the theory of unconscious thought. According
to the obtained data set, it is a better idea to consciously
think about different choice alternatives in order to ar-
rive at the best choice than letting the unconscious do
the work. Not only, it seems, does conscious thinking
lead to the better identiﬁcation of the top choice, but it
also allows to differentiate between gradual choice op-
tions. With unconscious thought the choice is a muddy
one; it did not consistently help individuals to differen-
tiate between choice alternatives. Unconscious thought
failed to allow a clear distinction of the cars; contrary to
the expectations conscious thought did do just that.
While some alternative explanations for the diver-
gence from the expected results were investigated (re-
cency effects, weighing differences, scale usage differ-
ences), other factors in which the present study differed
fromDijksterhuisetal.(2006)mayhavebeenresponsible
for the reversal of results. An obvious difference between
this and the Dijksterhuis study was that this experiment
was carried out with English material and Australian stu-
dents. It is difﬁcult to imagine, however, how cultural
or linguistic variation could have had such a radical ef-
fect on decision making quality. Similarly, delivering the
information to a group rather than on an individual ba-
sis is unlikely to have had any impact, especially since
participants were engaged in the task and did not distract
one another during the task presentation or the thought
interval. One other noteworthy difference between this
experiment and the original study is the distractor task
used. Dijksterhuis et al. mainly used anagrams to keep
participants in the unconscious thought condition busy; a
word search task was used here. Anagrams have been
widely used in the study of incubation (see for exam-
ple Vul & Pashler, 2007) and seem to be positively re-
lated to the kind of processes activated during uncon-
scious thought. Hence, anagram solving might have had
a positive mediator function. Word search, on the other
hand, does not have much in common with unconscious
thought, as most people scan the array of letters system-
atically for the correct combinations. Hence it is more
akin to conscious thought. However, in some studies Di-
jksterhuis (2004b) and also Ham (Ham, Bos, & Doorn,
submitted) used the n-back task (Kane, Conway, Miura,
& Colﬂesh, 2007). This task puts high demand on ex-
ecutive functioning and also can hardly be conceived as
supporting unconscious thought. Nevertheless, the pos-
sibility that the type of distractor tasks affects decision
making efﬁciency under unconscious thought conditions
warrants further study and could be used as a moderator
variable in future meta-analyses when more experiments
with distractor tasks other than anagrams are available. If
all these three alternative explanations can be discounted,
then the results of the present study provide strong evi-
dence that the true effect size for unconscious thought is
much smaller than assumed so far or that this particular
experimental approach is not very suitable to demonstrate
the unconscious thought effect reliably. Further support
for either of these two conclusions comes from the meta-
analytic ﬁndings presented here.
4.2 Meta-analysis
The statistical synthesis of all available data provides
at best suggestive evidence in favour of unconscious
thought, but, on the basis of 888 subjects tested under
similar conditions, there is no convincing statistical evi-
dence. The true effect in the population may be anything
between a moderate beneﬁt after unconscious thought
to a slight advantage following conscious thought. One
sign for caution is that the experiments with fewer par-
ticipants consistently generated substantially larger effect
sizes than the larger studies.
4.3 Moderator variables
Four moderator variables were investigated in the present
meta-analysis. Of these, only the presentation format
as either single item or list-wise, did help to explain
the variance between studies, which is substantial. On
the other hand, gender-ratio, presentation time per item
and thought interval length were very weak predictors
of effect. This weakness, however, may have partiallyJudgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 4, April 2008 Conscious versus unconscious thought 302
been due to methodological constraints. For example,
the moderator effect for gender ratio looked at the to-
tal number of males and females in the experiment. A
better estimator would be the ratio of males to females
within the speciﬁc conditions, since there may be inter-
actions that cannot be uncovered by looking at the to-
tal number for each gender alone. Secondly, there may
be higher order interactions between different moderators
that obscure any simple effects. This meta-analysis car-
ried out only simple meta-regressions, but there is reason
to believe that multiple meta-regression may ﬁnd rela-
tionships, given that I2 turned out to be large. Before such
analysis is feasible, though, more studies are required to
ensure the statistical soundness of the analysis (Boren-
stein et al., 2008).
Beside the ones investigated here, further potential
moderators have been identiﬁed. Conﬁgural versus fea-
tural processing (Lerouge, submitted) or self-paced de-
cision making (Payne et al., 2007) and perhaps the type
of distractor task are promising candidates. These will
require much more data do make them suitable for meta-
analysis. Further, the present selection of experiments
was restricted to normative choices, but this in itself may
be a factor affecting the efﬁciency of unconscious or
conscious thought. Future approaches should thus in-
clude studies that operationalise good decision making
with subjective degrees of decision satisfaction. Finally,
the meta-analytic conﬁrmed effect of presentation format
should be investigated in a speciﬁcally designed study.
At this stage, with few experiments, the result may still
be spurious, especially since higher order interaction of
moderators and task conditions are unclear.
4.4 Other comparisons
The primary focus of the present study was to illumi-
nate the current state of affairs regarding unconscious
versus conscious thought. The comparison between un-
conscious or conscious thought and immediate decision
can further help to draw some useful conclusions. On
the basis of 13 sets of data, there is no statistical evi-
dence to suggest that either form of thought following
stimulus presentation leads to better choices than imme-
diate decision making. This, again, is quite surprising
given prior evidence for conscious thought processing as
represented in, for example, the weighted-additive model
of decision making (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976). The fact
that the meta-analytic review is not able to distinguish
between the three alternative ways of decision making at
all reinforces two possibilities: 1., other variables such as
presentation format or even gender signiﬁcantly interact
with decision making condition; or, 2., the general ap-
proach is not suitable to differentiate modes of thought
and might instead reﬂect other inﬂuences (see, for exam-
ple, Newell et al. [submitted], Experiment 4).
As shown by the present study, the early ﬁnding that
unconsciousthoughtleadstonormativelybetterdecisions
than conscious thought (Dijksterhuis, 2004, Experiment
1), which provided the starting point for further devel-
opments of the theory of unconscious thought, is unsup-
ported when looked at from a meta-analytic perspective.
However, this insight became possible only through the
inclusion of many data sets that are yet to be published.
All currently published data, with the exception of the
present empirical study, showed uniform support for the
theory of unconscious thought. The actual variability in
results that was demonstrated by the inclusion of addi-
tional, unpublished data thus reinforces the need to get
more results out in the open.
4.5 Conclusion
In summary, the ﬁndings reported here in conjunction
with the ones found in Newell et al. (submitted), Payne
et al. (2007), Phillips et al. (2007) and Lerouge (submit-
ted) cast doubt on the unqualiﬁed claim that unconscious
thought is the superior way of processing information for
important and complex choices. So far the bulk of stud-
ies had provided conﬁrmatory evidence for unconscious
thoughtin differentcontextssuch as justiceand consumer
choice, in the laboratory as well as in more naturalistic
studies, and with different dependent variables. Taken
together, these studies were certainly bolstering the di-
vergent validity of the theory of unconscious thought.
However, with the inclusion of new results, the theory
will have to explain the effects of moderator variables
as shown in Lerouge (submitted) or Payne et al. (2007)
and, at least for normative choices, will have to step away
from choice model that identiﬁes the rational choice as
the one with most positive attributes (see Newell et al.)
if it is to retain internal validity and produce correct pre-
dictions. For the time being there is little guarantee that
unconscious thought will truly be a good aid when faced
with complex and important decisions.
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